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COMMENTS
Copyright Protection of Systems Control
Software Stored in Read Only Memory
Chips: Into the World of Gulliver's Travels'
INTRODUCTION
T HE advent of personal and small-business computers demon-
strates the dramatic influence of new technology on modern
society. As with the introduction of television, around which a
vast entertainment programming industry grew, software 2 pro-
1. This Comment has been submitted to the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition,
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
The reference to Gulliver's Travels is taken from Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Apple 1], rev'd
and rem., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Judge Newcomer used this analogy to indicate that
the complexity of the issue can lead to false syllogisms in order to conclude that copyright
protection should be used for certain kinds of computer programs. In this Comment, the
rationale of Apple I will be defended.
2. The term "software" will be used as the generic term for computer programs
which instruct the computer to perform various functions, such as balancing a checkbook.
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a computer program as a "set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as the 1976 Copyright Act]. A computer does
not perceive what people perceive; a word, like "DIVIDE", in a computer program ap-
pears to the computer as a string of O's and l's or a pattern of switch settings.
The role of software is illustrated in the following description:
An old-fashioned automobile that can be started only with a crank requires a
person to make a series of adjustments more or less directly to the engine; in a
modern car, of course, you need only turn a key and a system of electrical and
mechanical devices does the rest. In the modern computer, software has devel-
oped in such a way as to fill this role of go-between. On one end you have the
so-called end user who wants to be able to order up a piece of long division, say,
simply by supplying two numbers to the machine and ordering it to divide
them. At the other end stands the actual computer, which for all its complexity
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gramming has developed alongside a burgeoning computer mar-
ket. This booming software industry includes not only entertain-
ment software, such as video games, but also educational and
business software, such as music instruction, word processing, and
accounting programs. Without software programs, a computer
would be as inefficacious as a television without programs or a
phonograph without records.
Developers of software, possessing technical expertise, natu-
rally seek profit from the marketing of their programs.3 Like au-
thors and inventors, software developers desire legal protection
against the unauthorized use of- their work.4 Although judicial
is something of a brute. It can perform only several hundred basic operations,
and long division may not be one of them. The machine may have to be in-
structed to perform a sequence of several of its basic operations in order to
accomplish a piece of long division. Software-a series of what are known as
programs-translates the end user's wish into specific, functional commands for
the machine.
T. KIDDER, THE SOUL OF THE NEW MACHINE 41-42 (1981).
The term "hardware" will refer to the fixed components of a computer, like the video
display, casing, and electronic circuitry.
3. See generally T. KIDDER, supra note 2; Hohmann, Software: Creators and Crooks Play
Hardball, TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 8. "The problem it creates is that those who spend
what can literally be years of their lives creating a game, do not receive royalties from
game sales." Computer programmers "can find themselves millionaires at 20 but has-beens
at 30." The Wizard Inside the Machine, TIME, April 16, 1984, at 57 [hereinafter cited as
TIME].
Piracy, which can include either reproducing copyrighted or uncopyrighted programs
or selling such reproductions, understandably concerns people in this field. "Most software
developers and vendors view piracy as a threat that poses increasing danger to the personal
computer industry." Freiberger, Pirates Bedevil Angry and Frustrated Software Vendors, IN-
FoWoRD March 22, 1982, at 33. However, there are some people involved who see piracy
in light of marketplace realities. Steve Jobs, Apple Computer's Chairman of the Board,
stated that "[a]s the price of software comes down, the economic reasons for copying will
for the most part go away." Id. at 38. At present, demand far exceeds supply of new and
more advanced software to utilize technological improvements in personal computers. Sales
this year are expected to reach $10 billion, up from $2.7 billion just three years ago; pro-
jections indicate that sales of software for personal computers, "the fastest growing part of
the software industry," will increase by 44% annually over the next five years. See Software:
The New Driving Force, Bus. We., Feb. 27, 1984, at 74-75, [hereinafter cited as Bus. WK.].
Although it is not known how many computer programs exist, estimates vary from 8,000
to 40,000. TImE at 56.
4. This desire raises the specter of alternate means of securing protection of computer
programs, such as patent or trade secret law. To obtain a patent, a work must have utility,
novelty and unobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1982). Prior to 1981, the patentability
of computer programs was denied, see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), but in Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Court held that software which resulted in chang-
ing an article "to a different state or thing" may be patentable. Nevertheless, it is unclear
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treatment of software copyrightability might seem to be of inter-
est only to industrial insiders and intellectual-property lawyers,
the resolution of this issue will substantially affect the national
computer market, including both large companies and individual
consumers. Indeed, judicial rulings determining to what extent
protection should be afforded various software programs may gov-
ern the long-term availability, price, quality, and form of software
for low-cost computing services for business and individual users.5
Many of the legal questions involving software copyrightabili-
ty stem from both the purpose of the programs and the medium
on which they are placed. In addition, the function and physical
nature of the programs is relevant to one of the ultimate issues in
this area: is a particular software program a creative expression or
is it simply a component of the machine? This issue compels an
examination of computer programming itself. Programming can
be produced in three different language levels. High level lan-
guages, like BASIC, COBOL or FORTRAN, are written in words
and symbols that are readily comprehensible with training.' As-
sembly language instructions, an intermediate level language, con-
sists of mnemonic or alphanumeric symbols.7 These two languages
may be referred to as source code which comprise source pro-
grams. Finally, programs consisting of machine-readable lan-
guage, the lowest level language, are commonly labelled "object
whether or not software programs per se are patentable. See Stern, Another Look at Copyright
Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Anything for Object Code?, 3 Comrra L.J. 1 (1981);
Hohmann, supra note 3, at 10.
Another factor militating against pursuit of a patent is that it usually takes two years for
a patent application to reach the United States Office of Patents and Trademarks, and even
then the application may be denied or challenged. The life span of various computer pro-
grams, especially for arcade games, is considerably shorter than two years. See Hohmann,
supra note 3, at 11; Tripoli, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, RCA ENGINEER, Jan.-Feb.
1984, at 40. One author suggested that it may be because of the unsettled area of law that
there has not been an overwhelming number of applications for either copyright or patent
protection. See M. GEMIGNANM, LAw AND rH Cou'urER 93-106 (1981).
5. Recent articles in general information magazines depict the ramifications of copy-
right protection for software. See, e.g., Press & Sandza, The Bandits vs. the Lauyers, NEws-
wEax, Dec. 20, 1982, at 76.
6. An illustration of an instruction in high-level language is:
LET Z = X + Y
IF Z = A, THEN GO TO 60
This instruction indicates that if Z is equal to some variable A, the computer should go to
line 60 and carry out the instruction given there.
7. For example, STO A means "store A into memory;" ADC commands "add with
carry:'
1951984]
196 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
code" programs." A computer can only operate or execute a pro-
gram that is in object code.9 Since computers only function with
digital data expressed in object code, such programs must be con-
tained in a memory mechanism such as a read-only memory
(ROM).10 A ROM chip or cartridge containing a software pro-
gram and inserted into a computer is designated "firmware" by
the computer industry; use of the term firmware indicates that the
hardware and software are so integrated that the functions of
each merge."1
Software programs may be classified according to the func-
tion they perform. Application programs allow the computer to
perform certain specific assignments; the tasks may range from
word processing, accounting, and balancing checkbooks to graph-
ics and video games. Systems control software (or operating sys-
tems programs) controls the internal functioning of the com-
puter's components, such as the memories and printer. Thus,
systems control programs facilitate the operation of applications
software.
2
Initially, federal courts varied in opinion as to the
copyrightability3 of computer programs embodied in ROM chips.
8. Object code or machine-readable language is comprised of two symbols, that is, a
binary language consisting of O's and l's.
9. See generally M. GEMIGNANI, supra note 4, at 80-82; Stern, supra note 4, at 24.
10. A ROM is a postage-stamp-sized silicon chip containing thousands of chemically
printed switches. The object code is etched onto the chip in a pattern of opened and closed
switches (O's and l's, or high and low voltages). The contents of a ROM are fixed once
they are programmed into the chip or integrated circuit. Alternative methods of storing
object code include the use of magnetic tapes and "floppy disks" (flexible magnetic plastic
disks that look similar to 45 rpm records). These differ from the ROM in that the material
stored on these media can be erased and the disk or tape re-used to store other informa-
tion, in much the same way that a cassette tape can be erased and re-used. For a brief,
introductory overview of the workings of a personal computer, see Turing, Computers Made
Easy, ELECTRONIC FUN wrrH COMPUTERS AND GAMES, Dec. 1982, at 84,
11. See W. DAVIS, INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 488 (2d ed. 1981). Many recently
published books on personal computers contain comprehensive discussion of basic hard-
ware and software principles. See, e.g., F. MIMS, EASY-TO-UNDERSTAND GUIDE TO HOME CoM-
PuTERs (1982); R. DEAKmN, UNDERSTANDING MICROCOMPUTERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
NEW PERSONAL COMPTERS FOR HOME AND OFFICE (1982); J. WILS & M. MILLER, COM-
PUTERS FOR EVERYONE (1983); J. VANTREs & R. WoLENIx, A BUYER'S GUIDE TO HOME COM-
PuTERs (1983). The growth in the personal computer market has apparently spurred a
booming "how to" and "easy to understand" book market.
12. For a list of best-selling applications and systems control software, see Bus. Wx.,
supra note 3, at 77.
13. This term will be used to mean that a work is able to fall under the protection of
copyright laws. See Stem, supra note 4, at 6.
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Although it was not questioned that the 1976 Copyright Act and
the 1980 Computer Software Act' clearly afforded copyright pro-
tection to source code programs, the courts were divided as to
whether or not such protection was to be extended to object code
programs. 5 In 1982 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the applications software program for the video game "Defend-
ers," written in object code and stored in a ROM, was copyright-
able.' 6 This decision thus broadened the scope of copyright pro-
tection for computer programs. Recently, the Third Circuit
further contributed to what this Comment contends to be an ero-
sion of fundamental copyright principles by determining that sys-
tems control software falls within the sphere of protection granted
by the new copyright statutes.'
7
This Comment contends that the extension of copyrightabili-
ty status to operating system machine-readable computer pro-
grams is not only unmerited, but also signals a dangerous change
in what qualifies for copyright protection. Courts must examine
the characteristics and functions of object code programs under
the criteria for copyrightability stated in the legislation. Defining
the nature and uses of systems control software and weighing
competing policy considerations' 8 make this a complex and diffi-
14. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as the Computer Software Act].
15. Compare Apple I, 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd and rem., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983) (Apple failed to establish reasonable probability that object codes were enti-
tled to copyright protection) and Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F.
Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (object code in ROM is not copyright protected) affd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) with Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (an object code is a work of authorship, and a
ROM is a tangible medium of expression under the Copyright Act) and GCP Corp. v.
Chance, 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,464 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 31, 1982) (object code in
ROM was copyright protected since the source code was copyrighted).
16. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l., Inc. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
17. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Apple II]. Early this year the Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's
rationale by holding that the Copyright Acts make no distinction between computer pro-
grams that directly interact with the computer use and those that simply manage the com-
puter system. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
18. In order to give authors and inventors incentive to create various forms of intel-
lectual property, the Constitution provides that Congress "shall have power.., to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. This power, however, conflicts with the basic tenet of our political economy: free
1984]
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cult task. The recent litigation over copyright protection for ob-
ject code, regardless of use, poses analytical challenges for the
courts. Object code itself does not explicitly fall within the statu-
tory language of what is covered by the Copyright Acts. Object
code is software which is both not written down and furthermore
can be perceived only by a machine, not a person. Object code
thus fails to come under the literal requirements of the 1980
Act.19 When the object code loaded into a ROM contains an oper-
ating system program, there are even more reasons not to shield it
with the armor of copyright protection." An examination of the
legislative history and resulting copyright provisions and an analy-
sis of certain court decisions preceding Apple v. Franklin,2 1 will il-
luminate the meaning and consequences of the Third Circuit's
competition in the market place. Hence, any grant of copyrights, which is an exclusive
right, should be made on the basis that a privileged monopoly outweighs market competi-
tion. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). That section states, in full:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(Emphasis added). The construction of the statute urged here maintains that the percep-
tion, reproduction, or other communication must be directed toward a human audience
and not toward a mechanical one; otherwise, the phrase "either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device" is rendered superfluous. Thus, to the extent that a ROM is directed
toward and perceived by a machine (the computer), a program contained thereon is
uncopyrightable.
20. This Comment does not deal with the copyrightability of the audiovisual displays
apart from the computer programs used to produce them. Recent cases have held that such
an audiovisual display is protected under copyright law. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North Amer. Philips Consumer
Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid 669 F.2d 852 (2nd Cir. 1982). One test for determining copyright
infringement is how close one video game's theme and characters resemble that of another
game. The applicability of the "substantial similarity test" is discussed in Comment, Federal
Copyright Law in the Computer Era: Protection for the Authors of Video Games, 7 U. PUGET SOUND
L.REv. 425, 425 n.3, 426 n.4 (1984).
21. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
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opinion in Apple I.
I. TRACING THE STATUTORY HISTORY
A. Scope of Protection For Computer Programs Under the 1909
Copyright Act
Under the 1909 Copyright Act,2 protection for computer
programs was tenuous at best. A year before the 1909 Copyright
Act, the Supreme Court decided White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co.,23 a case which involved a player-piano roll having a pat-
tern of openings which made a piano play a musical score. The
Court held that the player-piano roll did not infringe the copy-
righted original sheet music because the player-piano could not be
read by a human being, that is, the player-piano roll was not "put
in a form which others can see and read. ' ' 24 The White-Smith deci-
sion was implicitly incorporated into the 1909 Copyright Act.2"
More recently, the Supreme Court held in Goldstein v. California
that copyrighting sheet music would not prohibit unauthorized re-
cording of the original composition under the 1909 Copyright
Act.26 Taken together, the White-Smith and Goldstein decisions did
not protect copyrights on source codes or programs from being
duplicated on magnetic tapes or disks27 since such machine copies
were not to be considered as infringing source programs because
they are not "eye-readable. '28 The "eye-readable" requirement
of the 1909 Copyright Act reflected the fact that copyrightable
objects should in some manner communicate expressions of ideas
22. 35 Stat. 1075, [hereinafter cited as the 1909 Copyright Act] (repealed by the Cop-
yright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982)).
23. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
24. Id. at 17.
25. 1 M. NrmER, NIm sER ON COPYRIGHT § 203(B)(1) (1981).
26. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
27. A disk is "[a] circular piece of magnetic material housed in a square jacket, sort of
like a record album. It spins inside a 'disk drive' and is used to store data, as a tape re-
corder stores sounds." Turing, supra note 10, at 85.
28. "These two cases imply that since computer programs represent tangible expres-
sions of intellectual labor, they are copyrightable, but copyrights on source programs will
not prevent unauthorized duplication of the program on punched cards or magnetic
tapes.. . ." Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computers and Computer Pro-
grams: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDiNE L. REv., 547, 558 (1982).
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to people. It is the expression of an idea, rather than the idea
itself, that is copyrightable. 29
Despite the uncertainty of the copyrightability of computer
programs, the United States Copyright Office in 1964 began to
accept and register software. This was partly due to the Copyright
Office's policy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration
where possible.80 Also, eligibility for registration required that the
program be published and that the copies of the program be in
language intelligible to humans. In this way the eye-readability
test of White-Smith was met. Nonetheless, since computer programs
did not meet this test, they were not, under White-Smith, within the
stated protection of the 1909 Copyright Act." Even before the
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, the focus of copy-
right law was expanded to include functional and commercial, as
well as expressive, works.3 2
29. See infra note 48.
30. See Boorstyn, Copyrights, Computers and Confusion, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 276;
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
(1964), reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 361 (1964). The Copyright Office decided
that copies of programs in eye-readable/human-intelligible form would be registered, but a
program which could not be visually perceived would have to be deposited with a printout.
Id.
Opinion is divided over the Copyright Office's policy. Stern states that this action "facil-
itates access to the courts to resolve the copyrightability issue." Stern, supra note 4, at 14.
In contrast, Mary Beth Peters, chief examining officer of U.S. Patent Office, said recently,
"The way the Copyright Office developed how they deal with the electronic video games is
a history in how not to deal with the new technology. It is close your eyes and register what
you have in front of you." Hohmann, supra note 3, at 11. The Copyright Office's policy
has since been overhauled: anyone who desires to copyright an object code must also send
a source code or source format on paper. In certain circumstances, the office may register
an object code if it is accompanied by up to fifty pages of source code; that amount of
source code suggests that there might be "some kind of copyrightable authorship." Id. at
11.
31. This anticipates the important question of whether or not object code is consid-
ered protected by the 1980 Act. It is clear, though, that if object code could not be consid-
ered eye-readable, copying an object code would escape copyright law prohibitions. "Seen
on a written page, a microinstruction (object code) is composed of a string of O's and l's.
These correspond directly... to strings of high and low voltages stored in a special place
inside the computer." T. KIDDER, supra note 2, at 99.
32. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (copyright protection afforded to statue as
a work of art although used as a lamp base; here the work could be separated from its
mechanical function); Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (code book of meaningless coined code words developed for cable use
deemed copyrightable); Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (copyright protection extended to symbols designating ques-
tions and response spaces on exam answer sheet).
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B. The 1976 Copyright Act and The 1980 Computer Software Act
Judicial construction of the 1976 Copyright Act demonstrates
the continued vitality of the distinction between copyrightable
works of authorship and uncopyrightable methods of operations."
Section 102(a) of the Act designates seven categories which may
constitute copyrightable items, all representing works that are di-
rected to a human audience.3 4 In contrast, section 102(b) of the
Act provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, il-
lustrated, or embodied in such work."3 5 As an illustration of the
distinction between the two sections, consider Rembrandt's paint-
ing "The Raising of the Cross" depicting Jesus on the cross. The
artist could claim copyright protection for the actual representa-
tion he made of Christ and copies of that painting; however, he
could not prevent others from portraying Christ crucified or from
using the same process to create a painting. Determining the
copyrightability of an operating system program depends on
whether it is within the scope of section 102(a) or whether it more
accurately falls within the ambit of section 102(b).
In addition, the 1976 Copyright Act granted authors exclu-
sive rights to their works with respect to reproduction, prepara-
tion of derivative works,36 distribution of copies (or phonograph
33. In Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the Court pointed out that the plaintiff
did not have the exclusive privilege to utilize the bookkeeping system contained in his
books simply because the books were copyrighted. Id. at 103. The Court in Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954), described the distinctions Baker made, stating: "[A] copyright gives
no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea-not the idea itself." Id. at 217.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See supra note 19 for the seven areas listed. The ulti-
mate purpose of the works in each of the categories is to communicate via the human
senses.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
36. A derivative work is a new item of authorship based upon and containing recog-
nizable elements of an earlier work. Only the elements not taken from the prior work are
copyrightable. Stern, supra note 4, at 14 concludes:
Like any other work of authorship, a derivative work based on a source pro-
gram must be fixed in a copy, which is perceivable by or otherwise communi-
cated to human beings. Object code therefore has no higher status as a deriva-
tive work than it does as an original work or as a copy of an original source
code work.
Although Stern may be theoretically correct about the necessity that a copyrighted
1984]
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recordings), and public performance and display. 7 There was
some doubt regarding section 117 of the Act, which explicitly left
unresolved the issue of using a copyrighted work (including a
computer program) "in conjunction with automatic systems capa-
ble of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information,
or in conjunction with any similar machine or process."' ' 8 The ap-
parent effect of section 117 was to preserve the status quo for
computer programs. 9
Congress was uncertain as to whether the act of inputting and
storing (i.e. copying) an entire dictionary, a computer program, or
other copyrighted work by processing it into an information stor-
age retrieval system for later retrieval or printout constituted
copyright infringement.40 Therefore, section 117 was adopted as
a means of allowing the passage of a revised statute without com-
mitting Congress to a position on the computer problem until fur-
ther studies were conducted.4 1 Also, the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU), estab-
lished in 1974, was still studying the issue of protecting computer
programs, another factor Congress considered in deciding that
section 117 should neither create any new protection nor limit
any rights that were in force prior to the 1976 Act.
CONTU recommended two provisions to replace the 1976
version of section 11742 which were adopted December 12,
work must be intended for human perception, neither the statutory language nor court
decisions have come to an agreement on whether or not human perception is a require-
ment for copyright protection.
37. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982)).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. I 1977), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981).
39. Rose suggests that "[i~n effect, Congress declared a moratorium on further legisla-
tive action regarding copyright status of computer programs...." Rose, supra note 28, at
559.
40. Some concern has been expressed about allowing copyrights of computer pro-
grams to extend protection to the methodology and processes adopted by the programmer,
rather than to merely the "writings" expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended,
among other things, to make clear that the computer program, and the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program, are not within the scope of copyright law. See H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659,
5661.
41. Id. at 5661.
42. NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL RE-
PORT (1978) [hereinafter cited as the CONTU FNAL REPORT], reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT,




1980.43 Section 117 now states that it is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make copies or
adaptations needed in utilizing the program or copies for archival
purposes. This implies that one who is not an owner of a copy of a
computer program is infringing on a copyright by copying a com-
puter program." In addition, the amendment expanded section
101 to read: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or in-
structions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order
to bring about a certain result.'
45
While many commentators have praised the new legislation as
broadening computer program copyright protection to acts that
are not explicitly included in the 1980 revision of section 117,46
this conclusion is not supported by specific legislative language.'
7
Although Congress made it clear that "expressions" are within
the scope of copyright protection, actual processes, methods or
ideas embodied in the program are not.4 Accordingly, the ques-
tion of whether systems control software constitutes a work of au-
thorship remains open to dispute. As will be discussed below, the
answer to this problem is an important element in determining
whether copyright protection extends to such programs in object
code lodged in a ROM.
49
43. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
44. Id. See Boorstyn, supra note 30, at 282.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This definition is similar to other definitions of com-
puter programs: "A computer program is basically a plan that controls the activity of the
computer, directing the calculations needed to solve a problem . Banzaff, Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1274 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 28; Boorstyn, supra note 30; Program Writers Get Ex-
panded Protection, CoMPUTER CAREER NEWS, Jan. 12, 1981, at 3.
47. Stern argues that since section 101, 17 U.S.C. § 161 (1982), does not mention
object code programs, such programs might not secure copyright protection. Stern, supra
note 4, at 9. The Apple I and Data Cash decisions indicate that this is a justifiable
conclusion.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. The dichotomy between ideas (which are not copyrightable) and
expressions of ideas (which are copyrightable) is one of the cornerstones of copyright law.
For example, if a photographer were to shoot a sunrise, he would have a copyright to that
picture; no one could legally copy that photograph without his permission. Yet the photog-
rapher cannot prevent others from standing next to him and taking a picture of that same
sunrise. An "expression," such as a novel, song or painting is a valid work of authorship
within the meaning of section 102(a). 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
49. This issue will be analyzed in the other parts of this Comment. See infra notes 116-
56 and accompanying text. Among various factors to consider are the extent to which
systems control software can be characterized as a functional device or as a derivative
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The 1980 Computer Software Act states that only a "copy"
of a work is an infringement of a copyrighted work. A "copy" is
defined by statute as the material objects in which a copyrightable
work (original work of authorship) is fixed5 or embodied and
from which the work can be "perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly, or with the aid of a machine or
device." 5' The present uncertainty exists because even though an
operating system program may be "fixed" in a "stable, tangible
medium of expression," that program may not be an expression
or work of authorship under the statute, because it is devoid of
any purpose to directly communicate with a person.52
Copyright law has evolved as technological advances have
been developed. Although the courts are reluctant to expand the
list of works protected by copyright without clear legislative direc-
tive,53 recent cases have increased the copyrightability of com-
puter-related items." Despite the fact that a majority of cases
have held that application software in object code lodged inside a
ROM falls within the realm of copyright law, 5 a comparison and
examination of cases that divide in opinion on this issue illustrates
the reasoning process the courts use in determining whether or
not to grant copyright protection. Far from being a moot debate,
such an analysis not only shows that there are valid arguments for
denying copyright status to such works, but it also foreshadows
work, and whether it is directly copyrightable.
50. "Fixed" here is the equivalent of "embodied." For example, a literary work such
as a novel is fixed in a book.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
52. See infra notes 101-20 and accompanying text. This is true whether the operating
system program is written in object code or source code, or embodied on a ROM chip or
floppy disk. However, it is when an operating system program is in object code lodged on a
ROM chip that it is best demonstrated that copyright protection should not be extended to
that type of program.
53. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Betamax]; Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
54. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982) (copyright protection for audio-visual displays); Wil-
liams, 685 F.2d 870 (copyrightability of application software in ROMs); Apple II, 714 F.2d
1240 (systems control software in ROMs copyrightable).
55. Williams, 685 F.2d 870; Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
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the Apple IP6 decision. Even if one ultimately concedes that the
majority view regarding application software is correct, it does not
necessarily validate the Apple II decision determining that operat-
ing system programs are copyrightable.
II. A REVIEW OF COURT RATIONALE PRIOR TO APPLE II
A. Differing Opinions on the Splitting on the Issue of Object Code
Copyrightability
As interesting as the scholarly analysis in this area has been,"
it is the courts which illuminate the practical difficulties of inter-
preting the 1980 Computer Software Act. Two factually similar
cases, Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.,58 and Tandy Corp.
v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,59 involved the unauthorized un-
loading of object code from a ROM chip. The district courts hear-
ing the cases divided on the issue of whether this act constituted
an infringement of a copyrightable work.
In Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. the district court
held that the unloading of object code from a ROM chip is not a
copyright infringement of any form of the program.60 Data Cash
had retained a consultant to design and develop a computer pro-
gram for a computerized chess game, "Compuchess." To create
such a game, the program went through several stages using an
assembly process to create a program in object code which was
56. 714 F.2d 1240.
57. Recent articles include: Merges, Apple v. Franklin: An Essay on Technology andJudi-
cial Competence, 2 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 62 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer
Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1723 (1983); Note, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HorsTrA L. REv. 329 (1982); Note, The
Copyrightability of Object Code, 59 NoTRE DAME LAW. 412 (1984); Note, The Current State of
Computer Software Protection: A Survey and Bibliography of Copyright, Trade Secret and Patent
Alternatives, 8 NovA L.J. 107 (1983); Note, Copyright: Computer Firmware: Is It Copyrightable?,
36 OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1983); Note, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.:
Duplication of Computer Program In Object Form Is Copyright Infringement, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 399
(1983); Note, The Medium is the Message: Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Cor-
poration, 18 U.S.F.L. Rav. 351 (1984).
58. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (1979), affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
59. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
60. The defendant took a ROM containing the plaintiff's object code and placed it in
a lower-priced, inexpensive imitation game. The district court reasoned that object code
was not a "copy" of copyrighted source code; in any event, object code was viewed by the
court as being an uncopyrightable utilitarian device. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
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embodied in the ROM chip. The ROM chip was then installed
into the computer as part of the circuitry. 1 When Data Cash mar-
keted Compuchess in 1977, it mistakenly believed that it was not
technologically feasible to unload a ROM chip. A competitor pur-
chased a lower-priced "knockoff" game on the market, containing
a ROM chip unloaded from the Compuchess ROM. This allowed
the competitor to sell a game that contained Data Cash's program
without incurring any of the costs of developing its own program.
Data Cash had only copyrighted the source code,62 not the object
code on the ROMs.68
The Data Cash court denied a preliminary injunction against
the defendants, utilizing common law principles and the 1909
Copyright Act. Judge Flaum said that at common law a ROM chip
is not a copy, just as a completed building is not a copy of an ar-
chitectural blueprint upon which the building is based.6 ' The
court then reasoned that at common law a copy of a computer
program is another computer program in its written form (i.e. the
flow chart or source phase) because these are comparable techni-
cal writings. A ROM chip, however, is a mechanical embodiment
of a source code and not a copy of it.6 5 This conclusion is based
on the 1909 Copyright Act which, along with the White-Smith deci-
sion, stated that a copy must be in a form which one can "read
and see" with the naked eye. 66
Data Cash seems to be vulnerable to criticism for failing to
apply the 1976 version of section 117, which would have com-
pelled the copyrightability and protectability of the program as
fixed in the ROM. Consequently, the court would have recognized
61. Id. at 1068. See T. KIDDER, supra note 2, at 42.
62. See supra text accompanying note 2.
63. See supra note 10.
64. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. Boorstyn argues that the copying of a ROM is
an infringement because the old concept of eye-readable copies has changed. A copy is now
considered to be an infringing copy if the work fixed therein is capable of being repro-
duced, perceived, or communicated by machines. A ROM clearly has the capability of re-
producing the program, with the aid of a machine, so that it is communicable to a person.
Boorstyn, supra note 30, at 284. See infra note 67.
65. "[A]t common law a copy of a computer program is another computer program in
its flow chart or source phase because these are comparable technical writings. While the
ROM is the mechanical embodiment of the source program, it is not a 'copy' of it." Data
Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1068.
66. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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duplication as an act of infringement.6 7 This, however, is an erro-
neous reading of the Data Cash decision. The court stated that
even if the 1976 Copyright Act applied, copying a ROM would
not be actionable.6 The court reasoned that in its object phase,
the computer program is a mechanical device which, like the elec-
trical wiring in an automobile engine, is engaged in the computer
to become an essential part of the mechanical process.6 Mechani-
cal devices which cannot qualify as pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works are not writings, and thus may not obtain copyright protec-
tion.1 It is probable, therefore, that the Data Cash decision would
not be changed in light of the 1976 Copyright Act."
Given the same issue, and similar facts, the district court in
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., held that copyright
laws do protect a program fixed in the form of a ROM chip."
Tandy involved a personal computer which contained a built-in
programming routine designed to interpret one computer lan-
guage code system into another so that the computer could per-
form problems and tasks assigned to it. 8 Tandy claimed that de-
fendant copied its program, changing only certain" items which
identified the program as Tandy's, and subsequently used the pro-
gram in its own home computer. The defendant argued that
ROM chips were not "copies" of the original computer program
within the federal copyright laws and, therefore, a ROM chip
which is a copy of another ROM chip does not infringe the copy-
right covering the original program. Tandy responded by claim-
ing that this type of fixation was covered by the 1976 Copyright
67. Boorstyn, supra note 30, at 283.
68. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1066.
69. For a statement of the analysis approved by the court, see Keplinger, Computer
Intellectual Property Claims: Computer Software and Data Base Protection, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
461, 464. See also Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
70. 1 M. Ni.ER, NnamER ON COPYRmGHT § 218(F) (1978).
71. See Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System Grapples with a Social Phenomenon, 64
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 335, 350 (1982).
72. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. 171 (1981).
73. See generally, T. KIDDEt, supra note 2, for an excellent discussion on the develop-
ment of source code and object code. Source code can be transformed into object code in
various ways. "Typically, in the course of compilation, each source code statement will be
replaced by one or more lower level statements. In between these lower level statements,
'linking statements' may be inserted. Some statements in the source code version may dis-
appear." Stern, supra note 4, at 8. This distinction between object code and subject code




Applying 17 U.S.C. sections 101 and 102, the court said that
a computer program is a work of authorship subject to copyright
protection, and that a silicon chip is a "tangible medium of ex-
pression," such as to make a program fixed in a form subject to
copyright laws.7 ' Thus, the practice of unloading and reloading a
program from a ROM chip 6 is an infringement of a copyright on
a source program. The court regarded amended section 117 as
not intending to provide a loophole by which someone could du-
plicate a computer program fixed on a silicon chip. Any other in-
terpretation would render the theoretical ability to copyright
computer programs virtually meaningless.
7 7
There has been some criticism of the Tandy decision.78 The
court relied heavily on the finding that the copying of the pro-
gram had involved, as an intermediate step, production of hard
copy (listing) of the copyrighted material.7 9 Some have argued,
however, that because current technology allows copying a ROM
chip without the production of a listing, that is, no "intermediate"
stage, the Data Cash rationale-that in order to qualify for copy-
right protection, the copyrighted work must be eye-readable and
non-utilitarian-cannot be dismissed.80 In addition, the Tandy
court's comments concerning a computer program being "fixed"
in a ROM chip ignore the statutory requirement that a "copy" of
74. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173.
75. Id.
76. Unloading and reloading a ROM is possible not only for video game programs,
but for any type of program lodged in a ROM. See Stem, The Case of the Purloined Object
Code: Can It Be Solved? Part I, BYTE, Sept. 1982, at 420, 426.
77. See 2 M. Nnom, Nemm ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 (1982). In a third case, the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC) refrained from ruling whether plaintiff Midway Corpo-
ration was protected by copyright law when a competitor unloaded plaintiff's object code
from a ROM and reloaded it into its own ROM. Certain Coin Operated Audio-Visual Games
and Components Thereof, 2 CoPoRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,298 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Investi-
gative Report, June 25, 1981). Midway, a United States distributor of video arcade game
machines, purchased the rights to the "Galaxian" video game from the Japanese creator.
After Midway marketed the game in the United States, other importers started to intro-
duce similar games with duplicated ROMs. Apparently, the ITC was hesitant to fill in the
void in the 1976 Copyright Act, regarding the copyright status of computer programs,
when Congress had not. Id. See Stem, supra note 76, at 426.
78. Stem, supra note 4, at 6.
79. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 175.
80. Kramsky, supra note 71, at 350.
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a program be made before an infringement can be found."1 Since
the statute requires that a computer program be "fixed" as well as
unlawfully "copied," focusing only upon the "fixed" aspect is in-
sufficient to determine if copyright protection is implicated.
Finally, the Tandy court's language implies that the computer
understands and reads object code like a person reading a literary
work (including a source program)., 2 A computer, however, does
not perform this in the sense a person does. Thus, the court's
holding assumes that non-human perception or communication to
a non-human is covered by the Computer Software Act. Yet, it is
not clear whether "perceived" and "communicated" in the statu-
tory definitions of "copy" and "fixed" actually intend human per-
ception and communicability. As an illustration, compare the
magnetic audio data on a cassette tape to an object code stored in
ROM. It is illegal to copy a protected audio cassette with a home
tape recorder because the function of the cassette is to reproduce
a song or some other audio message to a human being." How-
ever, it may not be illegal to copy or unload a ROM chip with a
stored object code because there is no intention of using the ROM
chip to communicate with another person.
The court in GCA Corp. v. Chance,8 5 following the Tandy court
reasoning, rejected the defendant's assertion that copyrighting
only the program in source code does not secure protection for
the program in object code. In GCA the plaintiff was granted
copyrights on certain programs in source code, including its "di-
agnostic system and its operating system series," although the pro-
grams were used in object code. 86 The court found that since a
source code comes within the scope of copyright protection and
that "the object code is the encryption of the copyrighted source
81. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982). The copyright law does not deal with the use
of a copy, but rather with the making of an authorized copy. For example, A may purchase
a novel, let B read it, and then pass it on to C without a violation of copyright law. Thus,
even if object codes in ROM are protected, it would not be a violation if someone used an
illegally copied ROM. See Maggs, Computer Programs as the Object of Intellectual Property in the
United States, AM. J. Com.. L. 251, 258 (1981).
82. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1980); see also Stern, supra note 76, at 428.
83. Stern, supra note 76, at 430.
84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 117 (1982). See Rose, supra note 28, at 565.
85. 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,464, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
86. Id. at 719-20. The court did not deal directly with whether or not operating sys-
tem programs are copyrightable.
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code," the two forms are to be dealt with as one work.87 Thus,
object code is protected by the copyright of the source code.8
Professor Boorstyn has argued that the new statutory defini-
tion of "copy" includes ROMs as material objects in which a pro-
gram can be fixed or embodied and from which a program can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated with the aid
of a machine or device. Therefore, the 1976 Copyright Act ap-
parently should afford copyright protection to a computer
program fixed in a ROM to the same extent that a work fixed on
a magnetic tape, magnetic diskette, phonograph record, or mo-
tion picture film is afforded such protection.89 The ROM, which is
a semiconducting silicon chip, contains electrical "instructions"
which play an "electromechanical" role in enabling the programs
to communicate with users.90 Other media which contain a work,
such as audio tape or film, possess signals that transmit the work
directly to the listener or viewer; thus, these media do not merely
perform a subsidiary function in a series of electromechanical rou-
tines which ultimately produce an expression on a computer
screen.
9 1
While the 1976 Copyright Act's definition of a computer pro-
gram might include object code program, the Act stops there and
does not provide that unloading a program from a ROM or other-
wise electronically duplicating a program in object codes violates
copyright protection by making an unlawful copy.9 The three
aforementioned cases, plus the two Third Circuit cases to be ana-
lyzed below, seem to indicate that the exclusive right to a
program fixed in a ROM is questionable."
87. Id. at 720.
88. Id.
89. Boorstyn, supra note 30, at 283.
90. See supra note 10.
91. Even conceding that a ROM chip may be a viable medium in which to fix a copy-
rightable work, that does not mean that all programs which are capable of being embodied
in a ROM chip are copyrightable. See infra notes 116-56 and accompanying text.
92. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
93. It must be remembered that since the majority of cases hold that application
software in ROMs is copyrightable, this analysis involves a first impression interpretation of
heretofore uninterpreted statutory provisions to new technology. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. The examination of these five cases provides a paradigm for the expan-




B. An Apparent Split in the Third Circuit Regarding the
Copyrightability of Object Code Computer Programs in ROMs
In Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.,"' the first
case dealing with a copyrighted computer application program in
the video game context, the plaintiff received three copyright reg-
istrations relating to the video game "Defenders," which Williams
manufactures and sells.9 5 One of the copyright registrations was
for the computer program. The defendant Artic is a seller of elec-
tronic components of video games. Artic sold circuit boards, pro-
duced by others, that contained electronic circuits, including a
microprocessor and memory devices. These ROMs used a com-
puter program that is nearly identical to Williams' "Defenders"
program. The result was a game and audiovisual effect "virtually
identical" to "Defenders." '98 Williams brought suit for infringe-
ment of its copyrights. The district court issued a permanent in-
junction against Artic. On appeal, Artic challenged the trial
judge's conclusions with respect to infringement and the validity
and scope of Williams' copyrights.
Artic raised several arguments concerning the copyrightabili-
ty of ROMs. Artic argued that there is no copyright for ROMs
since they are a utilitarian object or machine part.97 The Third
Circuit disagreed, concluding that Williams' effort to protect its
artistic expression of programs fixed in ROMs no more restricted
the plaintiff's use of ROMs than a valid copyright restricts an au-
thor's use of books; both meet the statutory fixation require-
ment.98 Artic next contended that a distinction must be made be-
tween source code and object code, arguing that source code is
copyrightable and object code is uncopyrightable. 9 The court in-
terpreted Artic's theory to be that a computer program-stored
ROM chip does not satisfy the statutory requirement of being
fixed in a material object because a "copy" must be intelligible to
human beings and must be intended as a medium of communica-
tion to human beings.100
94. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 871.
96. Id. at 872.
97. Id. at 874.
98. Id. at 875.
99. Id. at 876-77.
100. Id. at 877. Although the court formulated the issue of human-intelligibility, it did
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Judge Sloviter reasoned that Congress intended for a broad
interpretation of the terms "fixation" and "copy," which include
technological advances such as those present in the case at bar. He
found "that the 'fixation' requirement is met whenever a work is
'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated' for more than a transitory per-
iod."101 The court rejected Artic's claim that the broad language
of the statute be interpreted so as to limit the infringement of a
computer program to copying the program with other media,
such as magnetic disks or tapes, but not to the duplication of a
computer program fixed on a silicon chip.10 2
The Williams court implicitly sidestepped deciding whether a
ROM is part of the machine, and thus avoided determining
whether an object stored in a ROM is a utilitarian device which is
not within copyright protection. The district court in Apple Com-
puter Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.105 did deal with this issue,
however, as well as several others in an exhaustive opinion con-
cerning the copyrightability of object code stored in a ROM.
Apple moved for a preliminary injunction against Franklin,
accusing Franklin of infringing the copyrights on the computer
programs used in the Apple II personal computer. The programs
were in object code and stored in ROM chips housed inside Apple
computers. Apple contended that Franklin "stole" the logic and
structure of its system. °0 There was some basis for Apple's claim
in that Franklin's computer, the Ace 100, is Apple-compatible;
that is, it is designed to run most of the software written for Ap-
not precisely decide this question. Because the court looked at the "fixation" issue, it may
be implied that the court believed human communication is required. The court used the
"fixation"/"copy" language to demonstrate that the object code could be "readable" as
source code with the aid of a computer. Yet in transforming source code into object code,
some source code statements may vanish, thus indicating object code is not easily retrans-
formed into source code.
101. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
102. Judge Sloviter stated: "We cannot accept defendant's suggestion that would af-
ford an unlimited loophole by which infringement of a computer program is limited to
copying of the computer program... fixed on a silicon chip. This was also the conclusion
reached in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Ina." Id. at 877.
103. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982) rev'd, 715 F.2d 1240, cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Apple
1]. Although systems control software was involved, the significance of that aspect will be
discussed in Part III. Here, the analysis will concentrate on the general problem of object
code in ROMs.
104. Id. at 815. This practice is now known as "pirating." See supra note 3.
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pie II.105 Franklin maintained that Apple deprived non-Apple
owners of the opportunity to take advantage of the wealth of Ap-
ple-compatible material that exists in the market place.10 Further,
Franklin stated that it created a system compatible with Apple-
compatible software, which out of necessity shared a great deal of
the essential structure of the Apple II, especially the structure of
the Apple II's operating system. Apple, on the other hand, argued
that whether in a ROM or on a floppy disk, object code is a form
of expression and a work of authorship, not an idea or process,
and that a ROM is a tangible medium of expression, not a
mechanical device.
1 07
After noting that opinion has been divided on how to deal
with object codes when authorship is involved, and how to treat
ROMs in general, the court determined that a major issue was
whether Apple's computer programs are "fixed" expressions of
an author's "original work."' 0 8 The court found that, in the case
of computer programs, it is not clear whether the program de-
signer's idea of the operating system program, the ROM, is the
"original work of authorship." If the programmer envisioned the
flow chart of operations that the program would perform, copy-
right protection would apply since it would be an original work.
However, it may be that the designer imagined the architectural
structure of the ROM and the overlay of microswitches that
would be most economical and efficient for the system.100 If this
were the case, the court responded, the designer may be said to
have been an engineer designing a utilitarian aspect of the ma-
chine and no copyright protection could attach to it.al °
Judge Newcomer additionally questioned whether Apple's
105. Id. at 814-15.
106. Id. at 815.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 821-23. The idea of authorship tacitly goes to the issue of an intent to
communicate with other people. Id.
109. "To make the machine execute just one of its two hundred or three hundred
basic instructions, the coder usually has to plan the passage of hundreds of signals through
hundreds of gates." T. KIDDER, supra note 2, at 100.
110. From the description given supra note 109 and accompanying text, it is logical to
take the view that this is the case. Judge Newcomer notes that although ROMs may be
entitled to copyright protection as three-dimensional works of art, it is equally plausible to
view ROMs containing object codes as a physical device with an essentially useful purpose
or function. This latter view seems the more correct one to take due to the nature of ROM
chips. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
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computer operating system constitutes a form of expression or,
instead, an uncopyrightable idea or process.
[I]t is not clear that object code, which was not designed to be "read" by a
human reader and can only be read by an expert with a microscope and
patience, is a language of description. It cannot teach. It can be used to con-
trol the operation of the computer. For these reasons, it may be more accu-
rate to say that operating systems are an essential element of the machine
Similarly, it may be more accurate to say that object code in its binary
form or chip form is a useful version of the machine's electrical pulse."'
Further, the court noted that while copyright protection only sub-
sists in original works of authorship," 2 the process of constructing
a chip is not so much a work of authorship as the product of engi-
neering knowledge focused on obtaining a desired function or
output. Apple did not distinguish the form of the work from its
utilitarian purpose. By arguing that these works are "literary
works," Apple had suggested that their function and form merged
because each work as a whole conveys information. The test for
copyright protection requires both separability and independence
from the utilitarian aspects of the article,113 which Apple failed to
show. Finally, the court indicated that there are doubts as to the
copyrightability of the Apple programs because the expressions
embodied in the object code are not directed to a human being.11 '
For purposes of copyright protection, the expression, no matter
how indirect or exotic, must be intended for human perception
and understanding.11 5 Judge Newcomer concluded that the con-
cept of language means an ability to create human interaction; the
Copyright Act only protects the fixed expression of language.'"
The factual situations are similar in both Apple I and Williams
Electronics. However, to reach their respective conclusions, the
courts approached the issues from different viewpoints. Although
the Williams reasoning may be correct in pointing out that Artic's
position would limit computer program copyright protection, per-
111. AppleI, 545 F. Supp. at 821.
112. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
113. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668.
114. Apple 1, 545 F. Supp. at 821, 824-25.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 825. The court's language is unequivocal as to the necessity of intending
communication between humans. The court logically concludes that since object code is
simply meant to instruct a computer, it is not deemed to invoke copyright protection.
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haps that is the purpose of copyright protection. Judge New-
comer's analysis goes to the heart of the matter: authorship and
communicability. The facts indicate that engineers create object
code, which is intended to allow the computer to perform various
tasks. Object code is not properly protected under this analysis
since it is a functional device, rather than a literary work, that
does not communicate anything to a person. Yet such a result may
not be satisfying in light of the practical approach seen in Wil-
liams, since it would appear to allow others to unfairly use the ob-
ject code.
C. Lessons From The Pre-Apple II Cases
Both Williams and Apple I highlight the practical difficulties
courts face in interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1980
Computer Software Act when applied to an area that is not ex-
pressly covered by these acts. However, the two cases may be rec-
onciled on the basis of the two programs having two different pur-
poses. In Williams, the output was the video game "Defenders";
the Apple I case involved a computer that had a compiler program
(input-output routine).11 7 This distinction, however, conflicts with
the Data Cash and Tandy decisions, which involved the reverse cir-
cumstances. In Data Cash a computer program for a video game
was not copyrightable, while in Tandy a compiler computer pro-
gram for a personal computer was protected by the 1976 Copy-
right Act. Tandy is premised on the superficially attractive rule
that a program fixed in a ROM should be protected if its purpose
is to generate an image to attract and engage a human audience.
This rule, however, ignores the fact that an object code itself is
not meant to convey meaningful information to a person. Both
Apple I and Data Cash use a human communication criterion for
denying copyright protection to the object code lodged in a
ROM. 18 The rationale applied in Williams and Tandy would de-
feat the statutory requirement that a work be one of original au-
thorship, and be an expression of an idea rather than a utilitarian,
functional object. The process of constructing a chip is more an
117. "This is a computer program which tells the computer how to take the informa-
tion which is put into the computer by an operator in one computer language and translate
that information into a more simplified 'machine' language which the computer can under-
stand." Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. See supra notes 2 and 49 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 64-66, 114-116 and accompanying text.
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application of engineering principles than a creative expression.""'
The Copyright Acts should be construed to protect only
human communications directed at human audiences. Any other
interpretation would disregard the distinction the law draws be-
tween the utilitarian purpose and the idea itself.1 20 To hold that a
copy of an object code fixed in a ROM chip entails copyright in-
fringement of a source code is analogous to saying that a lamp
with a base in the figure of a Greek goddess is copyrightable as a
lamp as well as a statuette. If the lamp and the base-statuette are
inseparable, nothing may be copyrighted . 21 Here, the object code
is inseparable from the machine itself and has no author.
While the practice of unloading a ROM and reloading it in
another machine or device appears to violate the spirit, although
not the letter, of copyright law, the courts should be careful not
to weaken the exceptions to copyrightability for objects that are
utilitarian in nature and not an original work of authorship. This
suggests that Congress should state its policy toward such prac-
tices. However, it may not be a simple or correct solution to say in
so many words that object code fixed in ROMs are now protected.
Both Data Cash and Apple I have held that a communication di-
rected to a human audience is a necessary prerequisite to the ac-
quisition of copyright protection for an item. This requirement is
consistent with the copyright provisions. However, most courts
have determined that certain types of programs stored in ROM
chips should receive copyright protection regardless of immediate
communicability with people.122 Even if this is a valid interpreta-
119. Judge Newcomer's analysis in Apple I questions the patentability of object code
since it is not a new or useful art, machine manufacture, or composition of subject matter,
or any new or useful improvement thereof. 545 F. Supp. at 824. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976). See also Pope & Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA.
L. Rxv. 527, 539 (1979).
120. In Apple I, Judge Newcomer concluded that "to go beyond the bounds of [pro-
tecting only expressions of ideas] would be ultimately to provide copyright protection to
the programs created by a computer to run other computers. With that, we step into a
world of Gulliver, where horses are 'human' because they speak a language that sounds
remarkably like the one humans use. It is an intriguing analogy but false." 545 F. Supp. at
825.
121. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908,
reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979) (register's interpretation of regulation attempting to de-
fine boundaries between copyrightable works of art and noncopyrightable industrial de-
signs bars copyright registration of overall shape or configuration of utilitarian article no
matter how aesthetically pleasing was reasonable).
122. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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tion of the copyright provisions, the recent Third Circuit decision
in Apple II significantly extends this reasoning to programs that do
not have as their immediate or ultimate purpose communication
with humans. In addition, the Apple H court uses other principles
of copyright law to grant certain software programs unwarranted
protection.
III. APPLE II: INTO DANGEROUS NEW FRONTIERS
In reversing the district court's opinion in Apple I, the Third
Circuit in Apple 1112 determined that systems control software
programs merit copyright protection. 12 4 By granting
copyrightability status to these programs, the court violated cer-
tain cornerstones of copyright law. The decision demonstrates
that underlying copyright principles are easily manipulated to ac-
commodate awe-inspiring advances in the sciences. Although the
Apple II court discussed Franklin's claims under traditional tenets
of copyright law, the analysis indicates that the court misapplied
the law to the facts.
After reaffirming Williams"' on the issues of the
copyrightability of software expressed in object code 6 and
software lodged on a ROM,12 7 the Third Circuit in Apple II ad-
dressed the "heart" of Franklin's contention in the appeal: that
systems control software, as distinguished from application
software, is not the "proper subject of copyright 'regardless of the
language or medium in which they are fixed' "128 After acknowl-
123. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Apple fl].
124. The court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984) followed the rationale of Apple II. Prior lower court decisions found certain operat-
ing systems copyrightable without analysis of this issue. See Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173;
GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982), 2 CoPYRosrr L. REP.
(CCH) 25,464. The Apple 1I case was the first appellate decision to explicitly discuss this
issue.
125. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
126. Apple II, 714 F.2d at 1246-49. For a review of the facts in Williams, see supra
notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
127. Apple I, 714 F.2d at 1249.
128. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee at 15). The Williams court said:
The issue in this case is not whether plaintiff. . . could protect the ROM itself
under the copyright laws. Rather, before us is only plaintiff's effort to protect
its artistic expression in original works which have met the statutory fixation
requirement through their embodiment in the ROM devices.
685 F.2d at 874. It is contended here that Apple II involved non-artistic, non-communica-
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edging that this issue had not been involved in the Williams case,
the court turned to Franklin's principal arguments.
129
A. Systems Control Programs as "Processes" or "Methods of
Operation"
Franklin characterized an "operating system" as a method of
operation, process or system which is uncopyrightable under sec-
tion 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act.130 To bolster this conten-
tion, Franklin cited the doctrine espoused in Baker v. Selden:131 a
plaintiff's copyright of books does not grant him the sole right to
utilize the process elucidated in the books.132 From these princi-
ples, Franklin argued that employment of a method of operation
does not violate a copyright on the description of the method,
that purely utilitarian works are not afforded copyright protection
and that a monopoly may not be obtained for an idea under copy-
right law.133
ble works, thereby distinguishing it from Williams.
129. Id. at 1249-54.
130. Id. at 1250. Section 102(b) states: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
Two of the fourteen operating systems involved in this litigation were described by the
Apple II court as follows:
(1) Autostart ROM is sold as part of the Apple Computer and is embedded on a
ROM chip. The program has also been published in source code as part of a
copyrighted book, the Apple II manual. When the computer's power is turned
on, Autostart ROM performs internal routines that turn on the circuits in the
computer and make its physical parts (e.g. input/output devices, screen, and
memory) ready for use ...
(13) Apple 13-Sector Boot ROM is stored in a ROM located on the disk controller
card plugged into the Mother Board. By turning on numerous circuits on the
card and in the Apple II computer, this program causes other parts of the disk
operating system used for 13-sector format disks to load.
Apple II, 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4. Of the fourteen programs submitted for copyright registra-
tion, eleven were registered with the Copyright Office under the "Rule of Doubt," indicat-
ing that the Copyright Office was not able to determine whether or not those programs
contained copyrightable material. Appellee's Brief at 10-12 & n.4.
131. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). A substantial portion of this opinion was codified as 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See 1 M. Nnoam, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 25, § 2.18[D].
132. The Court declared that "copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot
give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds."
101 U.S. at 103.
133. 714 F.2d.at 1250. Franklin asserted that
Baker stands for several fundamental principles, each presenting what we be-
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The Apple II court rejected the contention that an operating
system program is a process by stating that it, like an application
program, instructs the computer to perform a task; there should
be no distinction between copyright protection for these two types
of programs. It would appear, however, that the two programs
have a fundamental difference in purpose. A system control
software program is an essential part of the machine and has as its
"primary" function the exploitation or use of an idea.'" CONTU
Commissioner Nimmer, in his concurrence with the CONTU Fi-
nal Report, implied that CONTU had over-extended protection
for certain kinds of software:
[I]t may prove desirable to limit copyright protection for software to those
computer programs which produce works which themselves qualify for copy-
right protection. . .. A program designed for a computer game would be
copyrightable because the output would itself constitute an audiovisual work.
S.. On the other hand, programs which control the heating and air-condi-
tioning in a building, or which determine the flow of fuel in an engine, or
which control traffic signals would not be eligible for copyright because their
operations do not result in copyrightable works.135
Operating systems designed to operate the computer itself are
analogous to the latter programs Commissioner Nimmer men-
tions, for they act as monitoring devices within and for the com-
puter.1 36 In his dissent in the CONTU Final Report, Commis-
sioner Hersey stated that "copyright protection [should] not
extend to a computer program in the form in which it is capable
of being used to control computer operations."'3 7 The court cor-
lieve to be an insurmountable obstacle to the copyrightability of Apple's operat-
ing systems. First, Baker teaches that the use of a system itself does not infringe
a copyright on the description of the system. Second, Baker enunciates the rule
that copyright does not extend to purely utilitarian works. Finally, Baker empha-
sizes that the copyright laws may not be used to obtain and hold a monopoly
over an idea.
Brief for Appellee at 22, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis original).
134. H.R. REP,. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5659-60.
135. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 27, Henry edition at 54-55.
136. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Cf Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University
Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (computer input formats were not
protected by copyright law). The Synercom court stated that the test was "whether the ma-
terial proffered for copyright undertakes to express." Id. at 1011. Again, the idea of com-
munication is involved.
137. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 37, Henry edition at 75.
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rectly indicated that the "medium is not the message"1 8 but it
failed to properly characterize the message. Even if the operating
system is embodied in a different type of memory device" it still
is effectively part of the machine once it is used; a systems control
program is qualitatively different than an application program 140
and should be classified as a method of operation, inherently inca-
pable of being copyrighted.
The Third Circuit in Apple II used the rationale of Mazer v.
Stein,"4 the CONTU majority opinion, 42 and the statutory defini-
tion of computer programs143 to conclude that an operations pro-
gram does not fall within the exclusion of utilitarian works from
copyright protection. Taken together, the court indicates that
these three sources suggest that the use of a program is irrelevant
and that there is no distinction between an operating program
and an application program.144 However, under the Baker-Taylor
138. Apple II, 714 F.2d at 1251. The court quoted the CONTU majority opinion,
which stated that:
Programs should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should
be considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction
equipment .... That the words of a program are used ultimately in the imple-
mentation of a process should in no way affect their copyrightability.
714 F.2d at 1251, quoting CONTU FNAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 21, Henry edition at
41-43. The analogy of a systems control program to a videotape or record is deceptive, for
in the former the program is a means or process, whereas the latter are the expression of
an idea. The majority also stated that "[b]ecause the distinction between copyrightable
computer progrmas and uncopyrightable processes or methods of operation does not al-
ways seem to 'shimmer with clarity' it is important that the distinction between programs
and processes be made clear." Id. at 18, Henry edition at 38 (citation omitted). In reality it
is an applications program, not a systems control program, that this analysis applies to.
139. See supra note 10.
140. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
141. 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (protection of lamp statuettes as art works under the 1909
Act). The Third Circuit utilizes the language in Mazer to determine that the intended use
or use in industry does not affect its copyright status. 714 F.2d at 1252.
142. The Apple I court quoted the CONTU majority opinion:
That the words of a program are used ultimately in the implementation of a
process should in no way affect their copyrightability. . .. The copyright status
of the written rules for a game or a system for the operation of a machine is unaf-
fected by the fact that those rules direct the actions of those who play the game
or carry out the process.
714 F.2d at 1252 (emphasis added), quoting CONTU FNAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 21,
Henry edition at 43, 42.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
144. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (an accounting form not afforded copyright
status although the explanation form was); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139
F.2d 98, 99-100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1943) (copyright is that which in-
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doctrine an operating system may be characterized as an essential
component of the computer since it controls the operation of the
machine rather than instructs or explains the operation.""' Addi-
tionally, Commissioner Hersey in dissent argues that such a
program
is a machine control element, a mechanical device, having no purpose be-
yond being engaged in a computer to perform mechanical work .... It is
clear that the machine control phase of a computer program is not designed
to be read by anyone; it is designed to do electronic work that substitutes for
the very much greater human labor that would be required to get the de-
sired mechanical result.1"6
By its nature, an operating system program performs a utilitarian
function, rather than ultimately to communicate with a person.
The mistake the Apple II court made was to look at the me-
dium of the program, rather than the program itself. Although
there is no stated distinction in section 101 between systems con-
trol programs and application programs, the spirit of the 1976
Copyright Act focuses on the protection of works or objects that
ultimately will communicate with people. A systems control pro-
gram is never intended to communicate with a person, and thus
should not be copyrightable." 7
structs and explains the use of art while patent is a necessary element of the machine). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5669-71 (distinction between section 102(a), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)
(work in a fixed medium of expression) and section 102(b), 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (a
method of operation)).
145. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 28, Henry edition at 61 (Commissioner
Hersey dissenting).
146. Id. Thus, an application program in object code should be copyrightable. See
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I11. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d
1009, cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 90 (1983) (program for visual display of video game in object
code protected by copyright). However, a systems control program should not be afforded
such protection. An operating system seems to merge its utilitarian function and expressive
purpose so that they are indistinguishable. See Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798-800,
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978).
Franklin contended that such a program also intertwined idea and expression so that
they were inseparable. See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at
742. The Third Circuit held that if alternate ways of expressing the idea are available,
there is no merger since a variety of expression shows that it is the expression, not the
idea, that is receiving copyright protection. See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wild-
life Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978);
Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926). While this is a clever argument, it still does
not answer Franklin's other contentions.
147. See supra note 19.
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B. Systems Control Programs as Works of Authorship
Although the Apple II court mentioned computer programs in
relation to works of authorship under section 102(a), 48 it did not
examine the substance of the underlying program. Rather, the
court focused on the copyrightability of computer programs in
general, stating that a "computer program, whether in object
code or source code, is a 'literary work' and is protected from un-
authorized copying, whether from its object or source code ver-
sion." 149 However, if material is to be eligible for copyright pro-
tection as a literary work,150 it must have a "communication
purpose." 51 Since a systems control program does not have any
expression that functions to communicate, it therefore should not
be protected under copyright law as a literary work.
Apple's systems control programs in this suit are methods of
operation of the computer "involving fundamental routines of the
machine which manage the functions of the machine. 15 2 These
programs are a series of electrical signals or instructions that en-
able a computer to perform in a particular mode. 3 Apple's oper-
ating programs are comprised of electrical signals that are compo-
nents of an electrical mechanism. These programs control the
electromechanical operation of the computer and, therefore, are
utilitarian and functional devices, unqualified for copyright pro-
tection." The Apple 11 court failed to address whether or not an
148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1982).
149. 714 F.2d at 1249.
150. Brief for Appellee, supra note 133, at 34. Franklin quoted the Synercom court's
test, "the litmus seems to be whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to
express," Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1011 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The Apple II court stated that "[t]he definition of 'literary works'
in section 101 includes expression not only in words but also 'numbers, or other. ..nu-
merical symbols or indicia', thereby expanding the common usage of 'literary works.'" 714
F.2d at 1249. Yet these methods are simply other ways to communicate; the court itself
calls them "expressions."
151. Brief for Appellee, supra note 133, at 35.
152. See generally supra note 11, and Brief for Appellee, supra note 133, at 34-38.
Charles Weddington, a program developer, stated that "[t]he operating system essentially
is a program that is internal to the computer and manages the internal functions of the
computer . . ." quoted in Brief for Appellee, supra note 133, at 26.
153. See generally supra note 11, and Brief for Appellee, supra note 133, at 34-38.
154. "It is possible to have an 'original work of authorship' without having a 'copy' or
'phonorecord' embodying it, and it is also possible to have a 'copy' or 'phonorecord' em-
bodying something that does not qualify as an original work of authorship." H.R. REP'. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5666.
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operating systems program is a work of authorship, thus allowing
the medium (here a computer program embodied on a ROM
chip), instead of the message, to be the determinative factor in
affording copyright status.155
Apple's operating system programs are intra-computer in-
structions that are part of the computer's operating process. Since
these programs function to command the computer to produce
positive and negative electrical signals, they have a noncommuni-
cative purpose to a human audience. Whether or not such pro-
grams are written in source code or object code, or are fixed on a
floppy disk or in a ROM chip, does not affect their copyrightabil-
ity. Even though a work may be fixed, it may be uncopyrightable
since it does not constitute a literary work. This is the situation in
Apple II, where Apple's programs are not literary works even
though they are fixed in a ROM chip. Scrutiny of the nature of
the work (operating system program), rather than simply the cate-
gory (computer program) or medium (ROM chip), reveals the
Third Circuit's error of allowing copyright protection to Apple's
programs.
CONCLUSION
As sophisticated technological achievements have been intro-
duced into commercial products, the courts have shown a willing-
ness to undermine basic principles of copyright law in order to
grant copyrightability to works that under a strict statutory con-
struction of the copyright laws would not receive protection. By
cloaking systems control programs with copyright status, courts
like the one in Apple H have brought copyright law to the position
Judge Newcomer foresaw:
To go beyond the bounds of this protection would be ultimately to provide
copyright protection to the programs created by a computer to run other
computers. With that, we step into the world of Gulliver where horses are
155. 714 F.2d at 1253-54; see also Apple Computer Inc., v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (following Apple 11) and Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management
Assistance, Inc., No. 81-1295, slip op. at 10-11 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (rejecting defen-
dant's contention that a systems control program "cannot be copyrightable because it is a
machine process.")
It is interesting to note that after nineteen months of litigation, Apple and Franklin
have settled out of court. Franklin agreed to pay Apple $2.5 million and not to copy any of
Apple's software. Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1984, at 67.
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"human" because they speak a language that sounds remarkably like the one
humans use. It is an intriguing analogy but false.'"
In carving out an increasingly broad area of copyright protection,
the courts are rendering factors such as ultimate communicability
with humans and methods of operation meaningless. Rather than
attempting to make tortured interpretations of the Copyright Act,
or to attempt constantly to update the Copyright Act, perhaps a
quasi-copyright or quasi-patent legislation could be developed. In
the meantime, it would bode well for the Copyright Act if the
judiciary would use some restraint in dealing with technological
and scientific cases instead of being blinded to the true nature of
the works seeking to be protected.
JON 0. WEBSTER
156. Apple 1, 545 F. Supp. at 825.
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